Jihad in Our Times
I think I am going to announce a new policy, on this five day old blog, and see how it works out. Please bear with me as I play with this policy to make it work. No anonymous comments, by which I mean I need reasonably identifiable information. An email with some sort of clear institutional affiliation is fine (@columbia.edu, @debevoise.com) or if a yahoo or hotmail address or something and I don't already know you personally, a name as well. I'll also filter the comments to ensure decency and civility, so please give them a chance to appear. I really hope this does not deter you because honestly I really do appreciate most of the comments I've received so far. It does seem though from looking at other blogs that potshots and name calling are much more likely to occur when someone is anonymous, and that hardly seems fair. You all know who I am, after all. On to Islamic Law.
Just a few days ago, the Council of Arab Justice Ministers concluded their 23rd session. Most of it was the same old same old, Israel is bad, now is the time to end corruption, blah blah blah. But the centerpiece this time had to do with terrorism. The Ministers reiterated their long standing position, which is that the Arabs should take a strong stand against terrorism and that terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians is absolutely forbidden in the true (hanif) Islamic religion. A representative article (in Arabic) describing this meeting is here.
So far so good, we all hate terrorism, and the intentional killing of innocent civilians. But, continue the Arab ministers, we must distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate right of peoples to engage in "resistance against occupation and aggression"). This is something of a reiteration of a number of previous treaties, including the Arab League's Arab AntiTerrorism Treaty (sorry, also in Arabic) and the (in English!) Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism, dated 1999, and the (also in English) OIC's Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2002, though these also include legitimate resistance to colonization and hegemony with a means to achieving self determination. (Those who don't know, just about all, if not entirely all, of the majority Muslim states of the world (from secular Turkey to hardline Saudi) are in the OIC, and all the Arab states in the world are in the Arab League.)
Here are the three observations that I think can be made from these various documents, all of which contain similar language:
1. These documents refer to terrorism in a consistent manner, but not in a way that the broader world would accept, or consider sensible. This is a position unique to the Muslim world.
2. This position relates directly to jihad in the modern world.
3. This modern jihad has absolutely nothing to do with classical shari'a rules on jihad.
Let's take each point in turn.
1. Terrorism and "Resistance" Distinguished
It is very hard to overemphasize the notion of "resistance" (muqawama) in the modern Arab and Muslim imagination. The idea of "resisting" the colonizer, the oppressor, the Zionist, the imperialist holds irresistible appeal. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iraqi insurgency, all of them refer to themselves as the resistance. When one wishes to question the actions of one or another of these movements (say Shi'is who have relatives killed by a suicide bomber in the name of this resistance), never do they cast doubt on the legitimacy of "resistance" but rather on its existence in a particular context. This is not a resistance, the Shi'i would say, this is terrorism. Thus is a line drawn between terrorism, which is illegitimate, and resistance to aggression and colonization, which by its very nature is. Thus do the documents distinguish between resistance to occupation and aggression on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. In the Kuala Lumpur declaration, specific reference is made to the Lebanese and Palestinian movements as being particularly legitimate. Nowhere is Hamas suicide bombing condemned as a result.
But this is not a line that the balance of the international community would consider sensible. Terrorism is a question of tactics; you might have an occupation, you might have internal strife, you might have a very real domestic grievance. But there are certain things you aren't supposed to do, that have nothing to do with the nature of your grievance. If we start to say certain activities are terrorism, unless of course they are part of a legitimate resistance to occupation, then we get into an intractable debate about what is and is not legitimate. If a Kurd blows himself up in a Baghdad cafe, would any Iraqi accept this as legitimate resistance to the occupation of Kurdistan? No, and the Arab League's treaty excludes any movement as resistance that threatens the territorial integrity of the Arab states. A ha, so we don't occupy, only the Americans and the Israelis do, resistance to our control is terrorism, to American and Israeli control, legitimate. The Americans and Israelis might have a different idea, and the notion that a definition of terrorism makes sense when we have to start to decide who actually has and doesn't have a legitimate grievance would strike most international law scholars as, I think, largely incoherent, though I invite them to correct me if I err. The conventions try to paper this over by suggesting international law permits resistance and not terrorism, but the references are unclear and in any event seem quite impossible.
So terrorism is bad, and Islam forbids killing innocents, but we have to distinguish between all of that and legitimate resistance, which are basically Muslim movements to return particular lands (Iraq, Israel, Kashmir, the Shebaa Farms in South Lebanon) to Muslim control. I guess I should also note that what is an innocent civilian is also frequently gamed by some of these movements to exclude any Israeli adult (because they are all in the army reserves) and large numbers of US civilians in Iraq, including at one point nurses and health care workers (because they are part of the occupying movement). Talk to Bin Laden, at least at times, and America's democratic system, which elected Bush (sort of), justifies regarding all Americans as combatants. Poor Dennis Kucinich, deeply misunderstood by Osama.
2. Jihad as Resistance
Let's also realize that the various "resistance" movements we are talking about are largely modern forms of jihad. Hamas and Hezbollah often refer to themselves as the resistance, indeed Hamas' name is an acronym in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance Movement, but jihad is never far from their thoughts either. The jurists and scholars who justify the activities of Hamas and Hezbollah of course are more wont to use the term jihad. The Iraqi insurgency is also dominated largely by those who employ the notion of jihad.
3. Classical Jihad
So far what we see is that Muslim nations, secular to religious, have signed on to a definition of terrorism that is basically uniquely Islamic. It creates an important distinction in that while it declares terrorism entirely forbidden by Islam, it carves out as an exception a peculiar form of jihad, defined as resistance to occupation and aggression.
It shouldn't be a surprise to know that the classical rules of jihad have nothing to do with the type of national liberation/anticolonialism/self determination lingo that is implicated in the modern documents. Colonialism was not a meaningful concept at that time, nation states didn't exist for nationalism to be something that made sense, and self-determination didn't mean a thing to anyone prior to the 20th century. Classical jihad, described in Majid Khadduri's magnificent
work assumed two polities, the Abode of Islam, led by the caliph, and the Abode of War, in lands beyond the caliph's control. Generally jihad was aggressive (not a surprise or unique to Islam at the time, it wasn't like Charlemagne was terribly concerned about territorial integrity or self determination either), designed to bring as much territory into the Abode of Islam as possible, or defensive in response to what Khadduri describes as a "sudden attack".
Of course, this two polity fiction was hardly an accurate representation of the classical world, but to glean from this anything having to do with modern Muslim jihadist movements is silly. What caliph? What sudden attack? What Abode? You can't take these ideas and make them somehow work to describe Hezbollah, Hamas, whoever. Self determination isn't the classical idea, and resistance to occupation isn't either. Repelling an attack? Sure. Initiating your own, absolutely. Not this, though. But people try to make connections.
They note how difficult it is to make Islam into a religion of peace given the Two Abode theory. News flash--the jihadists, the ones immensely popular throughout the Middle East, aren't talking aggressive jihad. Hezbollah and all of Shi'i Islam disclaim any right to aggressive jihad until the Mahdi (for simplicity's sake, that's Shi'ism's version of the Messiah) returns. Hamas likewise focuses on the resistance to the occupation. The whole Muslim world talks like that about jihad. Yes, Bin Laden (who is far more controversial in the Muslim world than Hezbollah and Hamas who are very very widely admired) wants the caliphate back, but listen to his grievances about the West, and it's they kill us here, they kill us there, we are under attack and we must fight back. I'm not defending this absurd notion of self -defense, only pointing out even in its most radical manifestations it's not described as converting the Abode of War.
So is it easy to get Muslims off of the "we have to convert the world by force" theory. Yes, they are off of it now. That's not the problem. The problem is a series of modern conditions, having nothing to do with shari'a of the classical age and having everything to do with seething Muslim discontent, that justify and burnish the notion of "resistance" to occupation, colonization, Zionism and hegemony as the solution to the region's ills. The weak and largely implausible connection between the violence and that drives this and classical jihad is much more afterthought than cause.
So fix those conditions, and the more liberal (and equally plausible) interpretations of shari'a, that the erudite Khaled Abou El Fadl, Abdullahi An Naim and Sherman Jackson have at various points in their careers pointed to will gain a foothold. Until then, this is the world we live in.
HAH
Just a few days ago, the Council of Arab Justice Ministers concluded their 23rd session. Most of it was the same old same old, Israel is bad, now is the time to end corruption, blah blah blah. But the centerpiece this time had to do with terrorism. The Ministers reiterated their long standing position, which is that the Arabs should take a strong stand against terrorism and that terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians is absolutely forbidden in the true (hanif) Islamic religion. A representative article (in Arabic) describing this meeting is here.
So far so good, we all hate terrorism, and the intentional killing of innocent civilians. But, continue the Arab ministers, we must distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate right of peoples to engage in "resistance against occupation and aggression"). This is something of a reiteration of a number of previous treaties, including the Arab League's Arab AntiTerrorism Treaty (sorry, also in Arabic) and the (in English!) Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism, dated 1999, and the (also in English) OIC's Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2002, though these also include legitimate resistance to colonization and hegemony with a means to achieving self determination. (Those who don't know, just about all, if not entirely all, of the majority Muslim states of the world (from secular Turkey to hardline Saudi) are in the OIC, and all the Arab states in the world are in the Arab League.)
Here are the three observations that I think can be made from these various documents, all of which contain similar language:
1. These documents refer to terrorism in a consistent manner, but not in a way that the broader world would accept, or consider sensible. This is a position unique to the Muslim world.
2. This position relates directly to jihad in the modern world.
3. This modern jihad has absolutely nothing to do with classical shari'a rules on jihad.
Let's take each point in turn.
1. Terrorism and "Resistance" Distinguished
It is very hard to overemphasize the notion of "resistance" (muqawama) in the modern Arab and Muslim imagination. The idea of "resisting" the colonizer, the oppressor, the Zionist, the imperialist holds irresistible appeal. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iraqi insurgency, all of them refer to themselves as the resistance. When one wishes to question the actions of one or another of these movements (say Shi'is who have relatives killed by a suicide bomber in the name of this resistance), never do they cast doubt on the legitimacy of "resistance" but rather on its existence in a particular context. This is not a resistance, the Shi'i would say, this is terrorism. Thus is a line drawn between terrorism, which is illegitimate, and resistance to aggression and colonization, which by its very nature is. Thus do the documents distinguish between resistance to occupation and aggression on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. In the Kuala Lumpur declaration, specific reference is made to the Lebanese and Palestinian movements as being particularly legitimate. Nowhere is Hamas suicide bombing condemned as a result.
But this is not a line that the balance of the international community would consider sensible. Terrorism is a question of tactics; you might have an occupation, you might have internal strife, you might have a very real domestic grievance. But there are certain things you aren't supposed to do, that have nothing to do with the nature of your grievance. If we start to say certain activities are terrorism, unless of course they are part of a legitimate resistance to occupation, then we get into an intractable debate about what is and is not legitimate. If a Kurd blows himself up in a Baghdad cafe, would any Iraqi accept this as legitimate resistance to the occupation of Kurdistan? No, and the Arab League's treaty excludes any movement as resistance that threatens the territorial integrity of the Arab states. A ha, so we don't occupy, only the Americans and the Israelis do, resistance to our control is terrorism, to American and Israeli control, legitimate. The Americans and Israelis might have a different idea, and the notion that a definition of terrorism makes sense when we have to start to decide who actually has and doesn't have a legitimate grievance would strike most international law scholars as, I think, largely incoherent, though I invite them to correct me if I err. The conventions try to paper this over by suggesting international law permits resistance and not terrorism, but the references are unclear and in any event seem quite impossible.
So terrorism is bad, and Islam forbids killing innocents, but we have to distinguish between all of that and legitimate resistance, which are basically Muslim movements to return particular lands (Iraq, Israel, Kashmir, the Shebaa Farms in South Lebanon) to Muslim control. I guess I should also note that what is an innocent civilian is also frequently gamed by some of these movements to exclude any Israeli adult (because they are all in the army reserves) and large numbers of US civilians in Iraq, including at one point nurses and health care workers (because they are part of the occupying movement). Talk to Bin Laden, at least at times, and America's democratic system, which elected Bush (sort of), justifies regarding all Americans as combatants. Poor Dennis Kucinich, deeply misunderstood by Osama.
2. Jihad as Resistance
Let's also realize that the various "resistance" movements we are talking about are largely modern forms of jihad. Hamas and Hezbollah often refer to themselves as the resistance, indeed Hamas' name is an acronym in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance Movement, but jihad is never far from their thoughts either. The jurists and scholars who justify the activities of Hamas and Hezbollah of course are more wont to use the term jihad. The Iraqi insurgency is also dominated largely by those who employ the notion of jihad.
3. Classical Jihad
So far what we see is that Muslim nations, secular to religious, have signed on to a definition of terrorism that is basically uniquely Islamic. It creates an important distinction in that while it declares terrorism entirely forbidden by Islam, it carves out as an exception a peculiar form of jihad, defined as resistance to occupation and aggression.
It shouldn't be a surprise to know that the classical rules of jihad have nothing to do with the type of national liberation/anticolonialism/self determination lingo that is implicated in the modern documents. Colonialism was not a meaningful concept at that time, nation states didn't exist for nationalism to be something that made sense, and self-determination didn't mean a thing to anyone prior to the 20th century. Classical jihad, described in Majid Khadduri's magnificent
work assumed two polities, the Abode of Islam, led by the caliph, and the Abode of War, in lands beyond the caliph's control. Generally jihad was aggressive (not a surprise or unique to Islam at the time, it wasn't like Charlemagne was terribly concerned about territorial integrity or self determination either), designed to bring as much territory into the Abode of Islam as possible, or defensive in response to what Khadduri describes as a "sudden attack".
Of course, this two polity fiction was hardly an accurate representation of the classical world, but to glean from this anything having to do with modern Muslim jihadist movements is silly. What caliph? What sudden attack? What Abode? You can't take these ideas and make them somehow work to describe Hezbollah, Hamas, whoever. Self determination isn't the classical idea, and resistance to occupation isn't either. Repelling an attack? Sure. Initiating your own, absolutely. Not this, though. But people try to make connections.
They note how difficult it is to make Islam into a religion of peace given the Two Abode theory. News flash--the jihadists, the ones immensely popular throughout the Middle East, aren't talking aggressive jihad. Hezbollah and all of Shi'i Islam disclaim any right to aggressive jihad until the Mahdi (for simplicity's sake, that's Shi'ism's version of the Messiah) returns. Hamas likewise focuses on the resistance to the occupation. The whole Muslim world talks like that about jihad. Yes, Bin Laden (who is far more controversial in the Muslim world than Hezbollah and Hamas who are very very widely admired) wants the caliphate back, but listen to his grievances about the West, and it's they kill us here, they kill us there, we are under attack and we must fight back. I'm not defending this absurd notion of self -defense, only pointing out even in its most radical manifestations it's not described as converting the Abode of War.
So is it easy to get Muslims off of the "we have to convert the world by force" theory. Yes, they are off of it now. That's not the problem. The problem is a series of modern conditions, having nothing to do with shari'a of the classical age and having everything to do with seething Muslim discontent, that justify and burnish the notion of "resistance" to occupation, colonization, Zionism and hegemony as the solution to the region's ills. The weak and largely implausible connection between the violence and that drives this and classical jihad is much more afterthought than cause.
So fix those conditions, and the more liberal (and equally plausible) interpretations of shari'a, that the erudite Khaled Abou El Fadl, Abdullahi An Naim and Sherman Jackson have at various points in their careers pointed to will gain a foothold. Until then, this is the world we live in.
HAH
'The problem is a series of modern conditions...that justify and burnish the notion of "resistance" to occupation, colonization, Zionism and hegemony as the solution to the region's ills.'
I absolutely agree with this, and your last paragraph as well. However, when I make this argument to others, they assume or claim I'm in effect being an apologist for "jihadist" tactics, they are simply unable to distinguish an argument for ameliorating the aforementioned conditions and a brief on behalf of the means empoyed by some Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere in their struggle against colonialism, post-imperialist hegenomy, post-Zionism, etc. Most Americans have neither the time nor will to seek out information sources other than those found in the dominant mass media that might help them come to appreciate the aforementioned conditions. They possess little or no knowledge whatsoever of the Modern Middle East (in addition to the ongoing massive ignorance of most-things-Islamic). This is one reason why it is so important to support alternative media sources (increase their accessibility and visibility; Democracy Now! being one such example; but also, for instance, pressuring Cable providers to include Al-Jezeera), as well as think tanks, institutes (like the Middle East Research and Information Project [MERIP]), and academic programs related to the Middle East, much in the manner that conservatives and neo-conservatives have established a plethora of such institutions to influence the powers-that-be and the educated public. I would include blogs such as this (and others, like Juan Cole's Informed Comment) as part of such a project. Academics must must help disseminate their knowledge outside the ivory tower in forms digestible to non-academics, and not remain content with traditional modes of scholarly production (put differently: overcome an obsession with careerism).
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Thanks for the comment. I quite agree that there are a few who will call just about anyone an "apologist" for jihad if they say anything more or less than "terrorism is from Satan." I'm not sure why that is. I'm certainly not out there saying this distinction between resistance and terrorism is sensible, I don't accept it at all. All I am trying to do is explain where in the (material) world it comes from, which is not age old Islamic doctrine but particular conditions and circumstances that are very modern. Thanks again for the support and the comment.
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First, excellent blog, Haider. The last two entries were immensely beneficial for someone interested in Islamic law but only vaguely familiar with it (like me!).
Second, I am very interested in the statement by the Concil of Arab Justice Ministers, but not terribly surprised. Throughout the history of international terrorism legislation / pronouncements, the Arab League and the OIC have, at times strenuously, resisted signing onto a more widely accepted definition of terrorism.
Granted, there is not internationally accepted definition of terrorism, but there are policy makers and scholars in the international legal community that might convincingly argue that this is *because of* the Arab League and OIC's reluctance to deal with the question of resistance movements.
I believe your point about distinguishing terrorist acts based on the strategy used is the correct one. Attacking innocent civilians as the primary target, to my mind, always falls under the category of terrorism. There have been sound legal arguments as to why this shouldn't be so, and not just from the Arab community. Several advocates for the underground Umkhonto We Sizwe (the violent wing of Mandela's ANC) argued that any white individual in South Africa was a de facto part of the apartheid regime. Some resistance to the finalization of a definition for terrorism comes from Africa as well, where anti-colonialism and self-determination are not historical topics, but political realities, although the nations filling the role of colonial master or tyrant have changed.
The focus of this reluctance towards a more universal definition of terrorism being based on the concept of a resistance-based jihad is a new idea to me. Not that it is new, just that I never knew that much about the inner workings of jihad! For that reason alone, the final point of the post is very useful.
Keep up the good work and I'll try to keep up with your posting!
Wes
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Thanks Wes, I did not know this about Africa. It only fortifies my conclusion that what animates contemporary notions of jihad is much less classical jihad than very modern circumstances in struggling post colonial societies.
I wouldn't suggest to have come up with a definition of terrorism of course, but I do think the idea that you carve out certain activities on the basis of their legitimacy is a hard one to sustain. The irony is that the OIC is one of the premier organizations calling for an international definition while stubbornly adhering to a resistance/terrorism distinction that few beyond the Muslim world (now I see Africa as well) would accept.
Thanks again for the comment.
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"Talk to Bin Laden, at least at times, and America's democratic system, which elected Bush (sort of), justifies regarding all Americans as combatants. Poor Dennis Kucinich, deeply misunderstood by Osama."
Bin Laden's reasoning is abominable, of course, but it is an interesting question the extent to which citizens of a democratic country are responsible for the policies of elected politicians.
On a related note, Americans, too, seem to have trouble *not* equating the actions/beliefs of foreign governments with those of their people, even with regard to non-democratic regimes. For instance, it's common to attribute hatred of Americans to your average Iranian when, in reality, the average Iranian has no truck with the average American (although he or she might disapprove of the American government). Iranians have an easier time, it seems, distinguishing between government and people - perhaps because of first hand experience of the ideological disconnect that can occur between the two. On the other hand, in a democracy it's harder to make the case for such a disconnect.
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Thanks for the comment. We both completely agree that Bin Laden's logic is odious and abominable and that none of this connection of a state to its people via democracy makes the slightest bit of sense or passes the easiest normative test for either of us when it comes to justifications for killing them. Just wanted to make that clear.
I think I agree with your central point that democratically elected regimes tend to be more closely elected with the people of the state that elected them than authoritarian regimes, but I think I might qualify that rather heavily. In a democracy, of course, the losers in a close election didn't get their wish at all, so the European who ascribes to an American tourist responsibility for actions of the Bush administration in, say, Guantanamo has pretty high chance of running into a guy who agrees more with him than a Republican. Then there are the people who are so apolitical they dont even vote or care, though maybe we can ascribe some level of responsibility to them for that. Then there is the fact that people who vote for a person might not have expected him to turn out the way he or she did, and finally, there are people who might vote for one candidate given the very limited options even though they abhor his positions in other ways. (The pro-lifer who is appalled by Guantanamo and all of US foreign policy, perhaps.)
As for authoritarian regimes, though they don't have elections to worry about, generally they do care about some level of legitimacy. Even an authoritarian government knows when it does something unpopular, there is a cost to that and so Iran, for example, tolerates the celebration of the Persian New Year which is based on a Zoroastrian (ie non Muslim) calendar given its immense popularity even while Iran's jurists are telling us here in the US not to celebrate Christmas. But you are right that they can force their will in large instances and so I do agree the association of the policy with the people is harder to make.
As for why Iranians or Iraqis distinguish better between people and government (though let us be fair and say that US presidents say all the time that they dont have a problem with the people of X, it's the evil/tyrannical/repressive/terrorist sponsoring goverment of X)), it might be that they actually get to see people from other countries more often. So your Egyptian cab driver seething and angry at the US for whatever reason, legitimate or not, picks up 71 year old Henry and his 68 year old wife Lucy from Pensacola, Florida who are on their way to see the pyramids in their first trip abroad ever, and as they talk to him about whatever it is you would think Henry and Lucy would talk about, maybe Egyptian food they like, maybe what they bought in the market that day, the cab driver realizes these are not evil people. They're ignorant about his country, that's too bad, but not evil, and he starts to make distinctions between Bush and Henry and Lucy, who may well have voted for him. But that cab driver never picks up Ori and Tali from Haifa, and so rampant anti-Semitism and Jews drinking the blood of Muslim children on Passover rumors spread. Similarly, no white dude in Pensacola picks up Mahmoud and Leila from Damascus and gets their opinion on cheeseburgers, and in the US we start to hear about how all Muslims seek to destroy the US.
Thanks again, much food for thought.
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