Shi'a Marginalization and the Rise of Hezbollah
There is much discussion about whether or not the United States should talk to Iran or Syria these days, particularly concerning Lebanon, and it's not really much my intention to enter into that kind of highly politicized fight, purely partisan political polemics are not my thing, or what the blog is about.
But it did raise a different point, which is that because there is no Shi'i nation that can effectively advocate on behalf of the Shi'a as concerns Lebanon, the legitimate grievances Lebanon's Shi'a do have aren't much discussed, which seems to me a problem.
The fact is that the Shi'a have been largely marginalized in most of the Middle East since the rise of the Arab nation-states. Overwhelmingly Shi'a Bahrain is controlled by a Sunni monarchy, Iraq until recently of course also kept its majority Shi'a population sidelined, and Lebanon has managed the same, though in not nearly as stark a fashion. (I won't even get into how the Shi'a are treated in countries where they are a minority, like Saudi.) The Shi'a are by nearly all measures the largest of the three constituent groups in Lebanon, and by law, they are NOT permitted to serve as President of the Republic (that's a Christian post) or Prime Minister (that's a Sunni post). They are guaranteeed instead Speaker of the Parliament, not the same thing as President or Prime Minister (any group who thinks it is, is welcome to trade). Government services in Shi'a areas are worse, the Shi'a are poorer, the result is disaffection and dissatisfaction.
Now what happens when a population is so marginalized, put off to the side, left weak and powerless and poor? Well, any number of things, but the Shi'a it seems to me call largely back on their own legends and stories, to explain the situation. This is where Islamic law, and Shi'i law, comes in. Of course, we Shi'a are marginalized, they always marginalize us, the story goes. We are history's victims, our Imams are killed by them, we are the pure bearers of the Prophet's message, and they hate us for it, they will always hate us for it. (I've written about this in earlier posts, see here). That's why modern Shi'ism has proven so remarkably adept at developing and strengthening its religious institutions beyond the state in som many countries, so that they are in no way dependent on the state, as Sunni religious authorities currently are (in a manner that causes them to lose some significant level of legitimacy). The Shi'i idea is that if hope cannot be found in the STATE because Sunnis cannot be trusted and will always corrupt it, if LAW will provide no justice to the Shi'a, then it will be found in the MARJA'IYAA, the Shi'a religious authorities, and in the shari'a, and yes, in the militias acting in its name, whether they be in Iraq, or Lebanon, or anywhere else.
Now that's not to say that the Shi'a don't practice their own forms of marginalization when they do take control, for example in Iraq. But when they do, the Sunnis have interlocutors in the form of Saudi, Egypt, Jordan, who can come to the US and tell that side of the story. And so in Iraq, for example, all of the early moves were to placate the Shi'a and the Kurds, who were the opposition that the Americans knew well (talabani, Barzani, Chalabi, Hakim, Ja'fari, etc.) That's what the disbanding of the Army and de-Baathification were all about--they were and are broadly supported by those populations, it's not like Bremer did something nobody liked, he did these things with broad support, just no Sunni support. And at some point, the Sunni neighbor interlocutors talked, and the Sunni Iraqis developed a voice, in the media, in the government, in the US embassy, and it became conventional wisdom you can't just kiss off these guys, you have to deal with them, or their insurgency will continue on forever.
The Shi'a have no similar interlocutor, and so while the situations to me are quite similar, the Lebanese Shi'a feel shut out as the Iraqi Sunnis did, in a fragile democracy, and while in Iraq there has been broad recognition that the only solution to the insurgency is to include them while taking an iron fist to the insurgency, in Lebanon no similar recognition exists, it's all about crush Hezbollah, which is fine, the iron fist is part of it, but what then are you going to entice the Shi'a with? You can't just keep a people this marginalized and expect anything different to emerge. You have to engage them, and right now, none of that is being done, it's all about force.
Some people, indeed a lot of people, do recognize that problem. Michael Young who writes on Lebanon mentions it a lot, even Obama according to David Brooks said something. Still, there's nobody out there to play the role of interlocutor to advocate their cause in a clear, repeated, forceful and consistent fashion, to make the case over and over. This isn't because there aren't "moderate" Shi'a, it's because the ones in Iraq are busy with their own problems, Iran has a president who is really off it now, and everywhere else the Shi'a are denied sufficient voice to play that interlocutor role. It's really too bad, I just don't see Lebanon improving unless someone proves to the Shi'a that it's worth playing the game.
HAH
But it did raise a different point, which is that because there is no Shi'i nation that can effectively advocate on behalf of the Shi'a as concerns Lebanon, the legitimate grievances Lebanon's Shi'a do have aren't much discussed, which seems to me a problem.
The fact is that the Shi'a have been largely marginalized in most of the Middle East since the rise of the Arab nation-states. Overwhelmingly Shi'a Bahrain is controlled by a Sunni monarchy, Iraq until recently of course also kept its majority Shi'a population sidelined, and Lebanon has managed the same, though in not nearly as stark a fashion. (I won't even get into how the Shi'a are treated in countries where they are a minority, like Saudi.) The Shi'a are by nearly all measures the largest of the three constituent groups in Lebanon, and by law, they are NOT permitted to serve as President of the Republic (that's a Christian post) or Prime Minister (that's a Sunni post). They are guaranteeed instead Speaker of the Parliament, not the same thing as President or Prime Minister (any group who thinks it is, is welcome to trade). Government services in Shi'a areas are worse, the Shi'a are poorer, the result is disaffection and dissatisfaction.
Now what happens when a population is so marginalized, put off to the side, left weak and powerless and poor? Well, any number of things, but the Shi'a it seems to me call largely back on their own legends and stories, to explain the situation. This is where Islamic law, and Shi'i law, comes in. Of course, we Shi'a are marginalized, they always marginalize us, the story goes. We are history's victims, our Imams are killed by them, we are the pure bearers of the Prophet's message, and they hate us for it, they will always hate us for it. (I've written about this in earlier posts, see here). That's why modern Shi'ism has proven so remarkably adept at developing and strengthening its religious institutions beyond the state in som many countries, so that they are in no way dependent on the state, as Sunni religious authorities currently are (in a manner that causes them to lose some significant level of legitimacy). The Shi'i idea is that if hope cannot be found in the STATE because Sunnis cannot be trusted and will always corrupt it, if LAW will provide no justice to the Shi'a, then it will be found in the MARJA'IYAA, the Shi'a religious authorities, and in the shari'a, and yes, in the militias acting in its name, whether they be in Iraq, or Lebanon, or anywhere else.
Now that's not to say that the Shi'a don't practice their own forms of marginalization when they do take control, for example in Iraq. But when they do, the Sunnis have interlocutors in the form of Saudi, Egypt, Jordan, who can come to the US and tell that side of the story. And so in Iraq, for example, all of the early moves were to placate the Shi'a and the Kurds, who were the opposition that the Americans knew well (talabani, Barzani, Chalabi, Hakim, Ja'fari, etc.) That's what the disbanding of the Army and de-Baathification were all about--they were and are broadly supported by those populations, it's not like Bremer did something nobody liked, he did these things with broad support, just no Sunni support. And at some point, the Sunni neighbor interlocutors talked, and the Sunni Iraqis developed a voice, in the media, in the government, in the US embassy, and it became conventional wisdom you can't just kiss off these guys, you have to deal with them, or their insurgency will continue on forever.
The Shi'a have no similar interlocutor, and so while the situations to me are quite similar, the Lebanese Shi'a feel shut out as the Iraqi Sunnis did, in a fragile democracy, and while in Iraq there has been broad recognition that the only solution to the insurgency is to include them while taking an iron fist to the insurgency, in Lebanon no similar recognition exists, it's all about crush Hezbollah, which is fine, the iron fist is part of it, but what then are you going to entice the Shi'a with? You can't just keep a people this marginalized and expect anything different to emerge. You have to engage them, and right now, none of that is being done, it's all about force.
Some people, indeed a lot of people, do recognize that problem. Michael Young who writes on Lebanon mentions it a lot, even Obama according to David Brooks said something. Still, there's nobody out there to play the role of interlocutor to advocate their cause in a clear, repeated, forceful and consistent fashion, to make the case over and over. This isn't because there aren't "moderate" Shi'a, it's because the ones in Iraq are busy with their own problems, Iran has a president who is really off it now, and everywhere else the Shi'a are denied sufficient voice to play that interlocutor role. It's really too bad, I just don't see Lebanon improving unless someone proves to the Shi'a that it's worth playing the game.
HAH
Comments