Orientalism and the New Iraq
Edward Said’s monumental work Orientalism is deeply critical of Western representations of the East as being more in fulfillment of Western conceptions of what the East should be than any sort of depiction of what it is. The East, in other words, is not given an opportunity to represent itself, it is made in the West into an alternative construction, one that plays into Western dreams and fears and downplays or ignores the voices of the East. Nowhere is this truer than in today’s Iraq.
Iraq, it seems, is a country defined by American benchmarks that relate to the American troop presence. That’s the media projection, that’s what the discussions in the political circles relate to. This may be terribly important to the United States, because it determines the length and nature of its presence, to the Arab world, because it is used to show the failure of the Iraq mission, to Europe, which is eager to move beyond the Iraq issue. The only ones left out are the Iraqi people, who are not on this ride. In conversations with residents of Baghdad or Suleymania, Sunni or Shi’a, Arab or Kurd, you don’t hear much about provincial elections laws, or de-Baathification, or how many Iraqi soldiers were trained today. Nobody cares, in short, about George Bush’s benchmarks.
What do Iraqis care about? On this I can speak with some authority, having been here about a month now and living in middle class homes rather than hotels. I get 4 hours a sleep at night because it is 90 degrees in the evening and when the power goes out, the generator cannot produce the electricity necessary to run an air conditioner. I aim to get a bit more sleep in the daytime when we get two hours of power in the afternoon, but sometimes it cuts off here and there for about ten minutes and then it’s so hot, sleep is impossible. I get a shower about three times a week, because the water supply is sporadic, it arrives twice a week for an hour and you have to send it up to a tank on the roof and then be very sparing in using it, you have about 30 gallons for a family for three days, after all. So what do I want right now? I want electricity, and I want water. It’s hard to care much about soldiers in the streets when this is how you live.
The problem is not so much that this goes unrecognized, but rather that it is continually viewed through the narrow prism of American interests. We need to restore “basic services” to Sadr City to give legitimacy to the Iraqi military presence, which gives the Iraqi government credibility, which lets America reduce its footprint. Of course, the Sadr City residents don’t want potable water because it might get rid of the Americans or enhance Iraqi credibility, they want potable water because they are God damned sick of dysentery. Unfortunately, however, that doesn’t seem like much the point of Iraq these days, to do something good for its people. That’s just the rhetoric, the mask underlying the power politics of international forces far more influential. The Arabs say we Iraqis want our independence, the Americans say we Iraqis want our freedom, everyone decides how we are doing according to benchmarks on these issues. Come on over and talk to us, and we’ll sing a different song. We just want to sleep.
As a case in point, about two days ago, there was a demonstration here in Suleymania to protest a law concerning provincial elections (specifically, as applied to Kirkuk), and in it was a microcosm for everything that I think is wrong with Iraq today. First of all, even in the Kurdish region, where the issue of Kirkuk burns most brightly, it was hard to find anything approaching passion. Clearly ask the Kurds and they care about this, and think their government is taking the right position vis a vis the central government. A few people mention this in coffee shops, or at dinner, but really, it was a rather marginal thing in their lives, a matter to discuss over a game of dominoes more than anything else. Certainly nobody I knew cared enough to actually want to attend a demonstration, particularly since the demonstration was really nothing more than supporting the position of the Kurdish leadership. Who demonstrates to tell their politicians they are doing a good job?
But in the media, this was important, a “benchmark” of our progress, success was central to the “mission.” On television and the news, we were inundated with this over and over, an impasse in the Parliament that nobody cared about, a Kurdish demonstration nobody in Suleymania much wanted to attend. But nobody mentioned that part. They mentioned the thousands in the streets of Kurdish cities mounting a protest, demanding the return of Kirkuk. This was important, CNN reminded us repeatedly, it threatens civil war if not resolved.
Somehow nobody in the West ever seems to understand how easy it is to force people out onto the streets, particularly if there is an issue about which they are indifferent, or, in this case, generally supportive if distracted by more pressing matters. Whether it’s Sudanese and teddy bears, or Iraqis and the Kuwait invasion, the Western media takes these matters rather seriously when large numbers appear, and seem to assume it is a reflection of real street sentiment.
It’s not England, for heaven’s sake. I am here, I saw what happened. The president of the university calls up the Deans, and asks where he might see them during the demonstration. The Deans call up the Associate Deans, let them know they’ll be waiting for them at a particular place. And so on down the line. Government offices are closed, and workers are arranged to march together at a particular time and place. Nobody actually issues any threats, as they did in Saddamist Iraq, probably nobody comes to beat you up afterwards, as they did in Saddamist Iraq, but the pressure proves irresistible. So most without legitimate excuses do what they’ve always done in Iraq, they show up, for about 45 minutes and make sure they shake enough hands and talk to enough people to demonstrate credibly that they were there to deal with any questions afterwards. Then they slip away, to gripe about the fact that the night before the demonstration, nobody slept more than 3 hours because it was brutally hot and the power shut off at 4 am. The remainder of the demonstrators who stay around are party apparatchiks, those guys couldn’t tell you what Article 24 of the Provincial Elections Law (the subject of their placards) even said. From what I could tell from conversations, all they knew was Baghdad wanted to bring the Kurds back to the place they were in Saddam’s time, and they wouldn’t stand for it.
So the fuss comes, and the fuss will go, and a benchmark probably achieved, and progress declared by some, disputed by others. But the ultimate point is that Iraqis will be no better off than they were before it all started, and Iraq’s real needs, as determined by its people, will go unaddressed. Because what Iraq needs is a plan to deal with this awful infrastructure and a disastrous economic policy that are making the lives of its people nothing short of miserable. Misery runs aplenty here, south and north, and I have yet to meet anyone between the ages of 18-35 who doesn’t want to leave. And believe me, it’s not because of Kirkuk. It’s because the infrastructure is the same now as it was following the invasion from the perspective of an ordinary person. I realize that Americans quite rightly feel that they’ve spent a fortune on rebuilding Iraq, and that it is time for Iraqis to finance their own reconstruction. What Americans should realize, however, is that your average joe hasn’t seen anything by way of improvement in the basic services. Water is scarce, electricity the same as it was, nothing has much changed.
Ask most Iraqis, and the solution to all of this is simple. Clamp down on corruption, turn on the oil spigots, and pass out more money, more pensions, more services, and all will be well. They do seem to know that this causes inflationary pressure, they just had a salary increase, prices just went up, but they aren’t sure why that is. They assume it was either government manipulated, so there wouldn’t be another request for more money, or that the government didn’t intervene to prevent the price rise, as they must in America or why aren’t the price problems the same over there? The idea that you can’t just pay people more with the same level of productivity and expect anything to change doesn’t seem to occur to most. And it is certainly a comment on Iraqi education that law professors, political science professors and judges all employ this sort of reasoning, that I am pretty sure were beaten out of me in high school.
The same might be said of redirecting misused government funds. Yes it is an embarrassment that the Kurdish Regional Government alone has 43 ministers. Yes it is ridiculous that those ministers, and Iraqi national ministers, and Kurdish Regional Parliament Members, and Iraqi Parliament Members, make around $10,000 a month each, in a country where my brother in law as a successful young engineer makes $850 a month. Yes the fact that each of them, even Ministers who have been in office for a few months, earn a pension at the full salary FOR LIFE, and yes the fact that the Kurds have 400 ex ministers now adds up to one heck of a waste of money to benefit barely qualified party hacks, most of whom I wouldn’t invite to speak at a conference, let alone head a portfolio. But clean all that up, and there’s still a problem.
The problem is partly security, though that can be overrated as a cause. The Kurds live in a very secure region of the country, it’s been safe for years. Power is better here, there’s about 11 hours a day or so. Three years ago, there was 11 hours a day. So something else is at work to account for the 13 hour gap in power then. Fundamentally, it is a bloated public sector, and a nonexistent private one. Everyone who graduates from college wants a government job, and the government obliges by hiring far more than they need. All those workers have pensions from the age of 63 to all citizens at 80% of final salary, for life. The government can’t hire everyone, so that creates high unemployment. They also provide power for free, and that costs a lot of money and limits investment. The talented end up in government jobs that are a waste of time, and so that stifles innovation. Private investment and employment really are just an arm of the dominant Kurdish parties, anyone who has a real business here is connected, and very close to the plutocrats. There's lots of enterprise and money starting to float about, as my earlier post showed, but it's all cronyist. If you are not a crony, you can’t operate, those who have tried have failed, and left. And thus everything that is drilled from the ground is consumed, one way or another, and little left for the types of projects governments should be doing.
Now it isn’t hard to at least talk about the kind of policies that will stimulate private opportunities and investment. Promises of tax breaks, encouragement of foreign investment opportunities, adjusting pension systems to favor private employment, and so on such that the public sector gradually reduces through attrition. Charging for electricity, reducing gas subsidies, all of these will help deal with some of these problems, and alleviate some of the crises as well. It is a central fact, however, that almost nobody in the Iraqi government, anywhere, talks about this. Ali Allawi was so remarkable as Minister of Finance precisely because he did, frequently and unabashedly. Most of the political class, however, obsess as the people do, over what government salaries should be, how more money should be given by the government to whatever group of people, how to provide more free electricity, more subsidized gas, etc. The idea that hiring all of these people and passing out all of this stuff is a waste of the country’s resources lies undiscussed, in policy circles where it should be, among the elite who should know better.
I think it is easy to understand why. The political class aren’t exactly technocrats, or people who know much about public policy. The class that runs the place grew up in opposition politics, they never actually ran a state, and now that they have one, they are so bereft of ideas, they naturally fall back on the ones they know, those of the Saddamist era. There’s a problem with the exodus of talented professionals? Here’s a solution—don’t give them their diplomas! Then they have to stay. Saddam had done the same, force rather than persuasion. Problem with the decadent West? Make everyone who has ever gone there come back and take an AIDS test! That will show them how clean we are, relative to them. Confrontation rather than cooperation, another Saddam trick. Interference with the Olympic Committee, arcane and inane bureaucracy, siphoning off massive sums on the part of each party’s elite, all Saddam tricks, all repeated here and now.
But the central trick learned from the Saddam era, the one that causes these rather severe problems with the most basic services through a bloated public sector, is the use of state economic power to stifle dissent. The Iraqi government, by retaining such control over economic affairs, is able to exercise a form of totalitarianism that is admittedly more benign than that of Saddamist Iraq (I say as one who has lost numerous relatives to the former regime) but still of the very same nature. The fact is if Talabani hadn’t hired so many people into the government, the streets would have been empty for the demonstration, save a few hundred or so. People who actually have jobs in this world would rather work than march in support of the position their own representatives are taking already. But when Talabani holds the purse strings, things are different. You better march when he tells you, and not march when he doesn’t want you to. The government ROUTINELY punishes workers who appear at anti government protests through a dock in salary, it can easily force people to obey it, and doesn’t need to resort to Saddam like violence, only a redirection of funds in one place or another. Given the influence over the private sector, it can even influence employees there, more indirectly. Call up your buddy who runs whatever and have him talk to the employee seen distributing leaflets. You don't need to torture him like Saddam did, threaten his job, and he'll be good.
So who then is left to counter these terribly dissatisfying affairs? If Iraqis are too accustomed to the government taking care of everything to imagine a world with a booming private sector, if the government is too corrupt and totalitarian in its instincts to develop free enterprise, who might be left to give a shove or a nudge? Briefly, the international community, and indeed the IMF and the World Bank have shown proclivities in this direction, leading to some modest improvements in, for example, the pensions law and a reduction in gas subsidies. Yet these are modest indeed, and the rest of the international community hasn’t shown much interest in these things. It’s not, after all, one of the benchmarks.
And so in sum I have very little near term hope that prospects will improve in this country in which I have devoted so much interest and energy. I am sure oil exports will rise, services will have to get better with the additional funds, but most of those funds will be wasted on more consumption—more corruption, more government workers paid to do nothing and a slowly bankrupting pension system that will result(after a spike once oil production gets going) in an ever downward spiral of standards of living as birth rates continue to rise (another thing the government won’t talk about). Maybe that’s enough to let US troops withdraw, but it’s hardly enough to lighten the misery, anger and despair of the Iraqi people.
HAH

This is a raw and illuminating view from the ground -- ground supplying a vantage point few others may obtain. It is, therefore, significant that your report is tinged with so much pessimism. I would be interested to hear your thoughts on whether it is too late in the game to intervene or somehow remedy the issues you identify with the government and the Iraqi bureaucracy.
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I never think it is too late, but I do think it is at the point now where these difficulties are so deeply rooted and so intractable that efforts to remedy are going to be costlier, slower and less effective. Personalities may change, parties may force others out, but I suspect they'll just do the same thing all over again. I tend to think changes that do occur are less likely to come from the US government, and more from the demands of private enterprise. I think Iraqis want private enterprise, they discuss at least THAT on the news every once in a while. At the same time, they want to control it, which is impossible. Hence the Kurdish investment law permits investment, with permission of a board that is supposed to be "independent" but undoubtedly is controlled by the political forces, and then has a very confusing dispute resolution provision and no mention of a choice of law possibility. The only people who would or could invest under that are going to be shady types, cronies of the regime, or oil people desperate for first mover advantage given the potential in that particular field. Iraqi government from what the Finance Minister says (Bayan Jabr--a wonderful example of cronyism, someone tell me why Bayan Jabr is qualified to run a Finance portfolio, what other than connections could get him a position like that) seems to be heading in the same direction. Who knows, this might supply the impetus for updating and change, that could spread over time. But you are right, I'm not optimistic, every time I return I become less so. Not so much the cataclysmic civil war, I don't think that will happen, but just a deeply corrupt poorly functioning inefficient nation state that despite its vast potential never seems to advance anywhere. I don't think even Kuwait is the model, I think it's Nigeria right now, which is downright depressing.
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