Yesterday appeared a New York Times article with some Iraqi Federal Supreme Court opinions discussed therein.  Though generally a supporter of the Iraqi judiciary, I do find this particular set frankly troubling, even if not nearly the imminent threat that it is portended to be by opposition politicians, of a near imminent dictatorship. But I'm a law professor, not a journalist, and my job is to try to provide depth and nuance to court opinions issued even as it is the journalist's to inform on a speedier, and therefore necessarily more reductive, basis.  (Not a criticism, both are necessary). So I'll take a few days.

For now, I did want to express my frustration at what I will call "the shifting grounds for failure in Iraq."  This appears to be almost a perfect reflection of what the left called the shifting grounds for justification of the war in Iraq offered by the Bush administration.  The criticism of Bush, as I understand it, is that the war was justified as being on the basis of WMD, but when the WMD were not found, then the justification shifted, to freeing the Iraqi people.  (Similar criticisms are raised respecting the Bush tax cut--justified as being a refund at one point because of a surplus, and then necessary to stimulate the economy because of a slowdown and a deficit).  No reason to question that criticism here, and now.

What is ironic to my mind is that there is now popularized in mainstream media and in perfect counterpoint to the shifting justifications for the war, shifting justifications for imminent failure in Iraq.  Depending on the day, and the time, and the person being interviewed, a pressing problem posing an existential threat appears, which is some random thing. Time passes, sometimes a day, then it's another thing totally inconsistent with the first, and then a third thing that couldn't be true if either of the first two were, and pretty soon your head is spinning and you are wondering, how can all of these criticisms, offered not by the journalists themselves necessarily but reported with all credulity by them on the basis of interviews, not be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism.  Which one of these is the real problem, in other words, and who is blowing smoke up a reporter's nether regions? 

Rather than tell more, I just show a representative example, done quickly via a fast Lexis search, of just a few New York TImes articles of the past six months or so.  I don't pretend to have completed an exhaustive empirical study and if I did I'd find a better place to put it than here. I do claim to be illustrating a rather persistent problem, by those who are inclined to be rather pessimistic about Iraq and its outcomes.

And here we go.

On the advantages of coalition government

Before government formed

In the end, many officials expect an eventual agreement on some sort of consensus government so inclusive as to be woefully weak, unable to assert itself and beset by stalemate over the laws necessary to shape post-American Iraq. (August 18, 2010)

If [it] succeeds it could leave Iraq finally with a government that, by being so broad-based, is too weak to tackle the tough problems that lie ahead. (Sept. 10, 2010).

After government formed

Government officials and regional experts see increasing signs that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal Al-Maliki is expanding his power, undermining the fragile democracy. . . .Members of Parliament no longer had the power to propose legislation.  Instead, all new laws had to be proposed by Mr. Maliki’s cabinet. (March 5, 2011).

(Just to be clear, that “Mr. Maliki’s cabinet” that’s such a threat?  It’s the  Council of Ministers, ie the government in the parliamentary system, ie that was criticized until yesterday of being “broad-based”, “weak” coalition government incapable of tackling tough problems and “beset by stalemate” over “necessary laws”.)

On the looming threat

Military Coup over Feckless Politicians?

The political class faces an impossible task, beset by feeble and corrupt institutions, the vagaries of Mr. Hussein's rule and a political culture that celebrates the spoils of victory.

The disenchantment is so pronounced, in fact, that many leaders see less a threat in the flagging but resilient insurgency and more in something unpredictable, what Mr. Abdul Mahdi termed ''an adventurer'' seeking to exploit chronic crises.

A leading politician related a recent conversation he had with a top Iraqi general. The politician asked about the possibility of a coup. The general, he said, deeming the talk serious, pulled out a map of the capital and provided a disconcertingly elaborate plan to execute one: overturning trucks to block the route from the main American base to the Green Zone, seizing television stations, besiegeing Parliament, and so on. (August 18, 2010)

Political Dictatorship with Servile Military?

Critics . . . accuse Mr. Maliki of taking a stronger hand over Iraq’s powerful police and military forces. . . His critics say he continued to strengthen his power by using his security forces to resolve political disputes . . . . (March 5, 2011)

Al Qaeda overwhelms hopelessly weak Iraqi military and political classes?

Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has managed this unlikely turnaround -- from a near spent force to a reinvigorated threat to Iraq's democracy in a little more than two months. . . . (Sept. 28, 2010).

How about all of the above , and who cares if they’re inconsistent anyway?

What would happen if, for example, Iraq’s political crisis flares into violence? What if Al Qaeda in Iraq regains control of neighborhoods or villages? What do American troops do if Iraq’s security forces launch a coup? (August 11, 2010)